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Abstract—NoSQL data storage systems have become very 
popular due to their scalability and ease of use. This paper 
examines the maturity of security measures for NoSQL 
databases, addressing their new query and access mechanisms. 
For example the emergence of new query formats makes the old 
SQL injection techniques irrelevant, but are NoSQL databases 
immune to injection in general? The answer is NO. Here we 
present a few techniques for attacking NoSQL databases such as 
injections and CSRF. We analyze the source of these 
vulnerabilities and present methodologies to mitigate the attacks. 
We show that this new vibrant technological area lacks the 
security measures and awareness which have developed over the 
years in traditional RDBMS SQL systems.  
Keywords—sql injection; nosql; sql; database; mongodb; 
nodejs; php; json ; injection; couchdb; cassandra; cloudant 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Database security has been and will continue to be one of 
the more critical aspects of information security. Access to 
enterprise database grants an attacker a great control over the 
most critical data. For example, SQL injection attacks insert 
malicious code into the statements passed by the application to 
the database layer. This enables the attacker to do almost 
anything with the data including accessing unauthorized data 
as well as altering, deleting and inserting new data. Although 
the exploitation of SQL injection has been declining steadily 
over the years due to secure frameworks and improved 
awareness it has remained a high impact means to exploit 
system vulnerabilities. For example, it was shown that web 
applications receive 4 or more web attack campaigns per 
month and SQL injections are the most popular attacks on 
Retailers ‎[1]. Lately NoSQL databases have emerged and are 
becoming more and more popular. Such databases for example 
are MongoDB ‎[2], Redis ‎[3], and Cassandra ‎[4]. Some of these 
NoSQL databases use different query languages which make 
the traditional SQL injection techniques irrelevant. But does 
that mean NoSQL systems are immune to injections? Our 
study shows that while the security of the query language itself 
and the drivers has largely improved, there are still techniques 
for injecting malicious queries. In this paper we wish to raise 
the awareness of developers and information security owners 
to NoSQL security – focusing on the dangers and their 
mitigations. We present new injection techniques and discuss 
approaches for the mitigation of such attacks such as PHP 
array injection attack, MongoDB OR injection, arbitrary 
JavaScript injection and more. 
II. NOSQL 
NoSQL (Not Only SQL) is a trending term in modern data 
stores. These are non-relational databases that rely on different 
storage mechanisms such as document store, key-value store, 
graph and more. The wide adoption of these databases is 
facilitated by the new requirements of modern large scale 
applications (e.g. Facebook, Amazon, Twitter) which need to 
distribute the data across a huge number of servers. These 
scalability requirements cannot be met by traditional relational 
databases which require that all operations of the same 
transaction are executed by a single database node ‎[5]‎[6].  
According to accepted database popularity ranking three of the 
most common NoSQL databases (MongoDB, Cassandra and 
Redis) are ranked among the 10 most popular databases ‎[10] 
and the popularity of NoSQL databases is constantly growing 
over the last years ‎[11] . Like almost every new technology, 
NoSQL databases were lacking security when they first 
emerged ‎[7] ‎[8]. They suffered from lack of encryption, proper 
authentication and role management as well as fine grained 
authorization ‎[9], Furthermore, they allowed dangerous 
network exposure and denial of service attacks ‎[7]. Today the 
situation is better and popular databases introduced built-in 
protection mechanisms (e.g.,‎[23]). Yet, many best practices 
from traditional SQL databases are overlooked and the security 
of NoSQL deployments has not matured enough. In this paper 
we extend the observations of Okman et al ‎[8] by providing 
detailed examples of NoSQL injection attacks. We describe 
CSRF vulnerabilities and discuss the actions needed to mitigate 
the risks of NoSQL attacks.  
III. JSON QUERIES AND DATA FORMATS 
In the following sections we demonstrate how the popular 
JSON representation format allows new types of injection 
attacks. We illustrate this on the example of MongoDB, which 
is one of the most popular NoSQL databases ‎[10]. MongoDB 
is a document-oriented database, which has been adopted for 
usage by multiple large vendors such as EBay, Foursquare, 
LinkedIn and others ‎[13]. 
Queries and Data are represented in JSON format, which is 
better than SQL in terms of security because it is more “well 
defined”, very simple to encode/decode and also has good 
native implementations in every programming language. 
Breaking the query structure as has been done in SQL 
injection is harder to do with a JSON structured query. A 
typical insert statement in MongoDB looks like: 
This inserts a new document into the books collection with a 
title and author field. A typical query looks like:  
Queries can also include regular expressions, conditions, limit 
which fields get queried and more. 
 
IV. PHP ARRAY INJECTIONS  
Let us examine an architecture depicted in Figure 1, where a 
web application is implemented with a PHP backend, which 
encodes the requests to the JSON format used to query the 
data store. Let’s use an example of MongoDB to show an 
array injection vulnerability – an attack similar to SQL 
injection in its technique and results.  
 
Figure 1: Architecture of a PHP web application 
PHP encodes arrays to JSON natively. So for example the 
following array:  
would be encoded by PHP to the following json: 
Lets consider the following situation: A PHP application has a 
login mechanism where username and password are sent from 
the users browser via HTTP POST (the vulnerability is 
applicable also HTTP GET as well). A typical POST payload 
would look like:  
And the backend PHP code to process it and query MongoDB 
for the user would look like: 
This makes perfect sense and is intuitively what the developer 
is likely to do, intending a query of: 
But PHP has a built in mechanism for associative arrays which 
allows an attacker to send the following malicious payload: 
PHP translates this input into: 
 
Which is encoded into the mongo query: 
 
Since $ne is the not equals condition in MongoDB, this is 
querying all the entries in the logins collection where the 
username is not equal to 1 and the password is not equal to 1 
which means this query will return all the users in the logins 
collection, in SQL terminology this is equivalent to: 
 
In this scenario the vulnerability will lead to the attacker being 
able to log in to the application without a username and 
password. In other variants the vulnerability might lead to 
illegal data access or privileged actions performed by an 
unprivileged user. To mitigate this issue it is needed to cast the 
parameters received from the request to the proper type, in this 
case string. 
 
V. NOSQL OR INJECTION 
One of the common reasons for a SQL injection vulnerability 
is building the query from string literals which include user 
input without using proper encoding. The JSON query 
structure makes it harder to achieve in modern data stores like 
MongoDB. Nevertheless it is still possible. Let us examine a 
login form which sends its username and password parameters 
via an HTTP POST to the backend which constructs the query 
by concatenating strings. For example the developer would do 
something like: 
 
With valid input (tolkien + hobbit) this would build the query: 
 
But with malicious input this query can be turned to ignore the 
password and login into a user account without the password, 
here is an example for malicious input: 
 
This input will be constructed into the following query: 
This query will succeed as long as the username is correct. In 
SQL terminology this query is similar to: 
 
That is, the password becomes a redundant part of the query 
since an empty query {} is always true and the comment in the 
end does not affect the query. How did this happen? Let’s 
examine the constructed query again and color the user input 
in bold red and the rest in black: 
 
This attack will succeed in any case the username is correct, 
an assumption which is valid since harvesting user names isn’t 
hard to achieve ‎[15].  
 
db.books.find({ title: ‘The Hobbit’ }) 
db.books.insert({  
   title: ‘The Hobbit’,  
   author: ‘J.R.R. Tolkien’  
}) 
{ username: ‘tolkien’, $or: [ {}, { ‘a’: ‘a’, password: ‘’ } 
], $comment: ‘successful MongoDB injection’ } 
SELECT * FROM logins WHERE username = ‘tolkien’ AND (TRUE OR 
(‘a’=’a’ AND password = ‘’)) #successful MongoDB injection 
{ username: ‘tolkien’, $or: [ {}, { ‘a’: ‘a’, password: ‘’ } 
], $comment: ‘successful MongoDB injection’ } 
username=tolkien’, $or: [ {}, { ‘a’:’a&password=’ } ], 
$comment:’successful MongoDB injection’ 
{ username: ‘tolkien’, password: ‘hobbit’ } 
string query = “{ username: ‘“ + post_username + “’, password: 
‘” + post_password + “’ }” 
SELECT * FROM logins WHERE username <> 1 AND password <> 1 
db.logins.find({ username: { $ne: 1 }, password: { $ne: 1 } }) 
array(“username” => array(“$ne” => 1), “password” => 
array(“$ne” => 1)); 
username[$ne]=1&password[$ne]=1 
db.logins.find({ username: ‘tolkien’, password: ‘hobbit’ }) 
db->logins->find(array(“username”=>$_POST[“username”], 
“password”=>$_POST[“password”])); 
username=tolkien&password=hobbit 
{“title”: ”The hobbit”, “author”: “J.R.R. Tolkien” } 
array(‘title’ => ‘The hobbit’, ‘author’ => ‘J.R.R. Tolkien’); 
VI. NOSQL JAVASCRIPT INJECTION 
A common feature of NoSQL databases is the ability to run 
javascript in the database engine in order to perform 
complicated queries or transactions such as map reduce. For 
example popular databases which allow this are MongoDB, 
CouchDB and its based descendants Cloudant ‎[16] and 
BigCouch ‎[17]. Javascript execution exposes a dangerous 
attack surface if un-escaped or not sufficiently escaped user 
input finds its way to the query. For example consider a 
complicated transaction which demanded javascript code and 
which includes an unescaped user input as a parameter in the 
query. As a use case let’s take a model of a store which has a 
collection of items and each item has a price and an amount. 
The developer wanted to get the sum or average of these 
fields, so he writes a map reduce function that takes the field 
name that it should act upon (amount or price) as a parameter 
from the user. In PHP such code can look like this (where 
$param is user input): 
 
This code sums the field given by $param for each item by 
name. $param is expected to receive either “amount” or 
“price”  for this code to behave as expected, but since user 
input is not being escaped here, a malicious input might 
include arbitrary javascript that will get executed. For 
Example, consider the following input: 
 
In its first part (in green) this payload closes the original map 
reduce function, then the attacker can execute any javascript 
he wishes on the database (in red) and eventually the last part 
(in blue) calls a new map reduce in order to balance the 
injected code into the original statement. After combining this 
user input into the string that gets executed we get (injected 
user input is colored in red): 
 
This injection looks very similar to “classic” SQL injection. 
The defense against such an attack is disabling usage of 
javascript execution but if still required, properly escaping 
user input that finds its way into the code. 
 
VII. HTTP REST API AND ITS CONSEQUENCES 
Another common feature of NoSQL databases is exposing an 
HTTP REST API that enables querying the database from 
client applications. For example, databases that expose a 
REST API include MongoDB, CouchDB and HBase. The 
exposure of a REST API enables simple exposure of the 
database to applications; even HTML5 only based 
applications, since it terminates the need for a mediate driver 
and allows any programming language to perform HTTP 
queries on the database. The advantages are clear, but does 
this feature come with a risk to security? We answer this on 
the affirmative: the REST API exposes the database to CSRF 
attacks allowing an attacker to bypass firewalls and other 
perimeter defenses. Let us examine how. As long as a 
database is deployed in a secure network behind security 
measures, such as firewalls, in order to compromise the 
database an attacker must either find a vulnerability that will 
let him into the secure network or perform an injection that 
will allow him to execute arbitrary queries. When a database 
exposes a REST API inside the secured network it allows 
anyone with access to the secured network to perform queries 
on the database using HTTP only – thus allowing such queries 
to be initiated even from the browser. If an attacker can inject 
an HTML form into a website or trick a user into a website of 
his own the attacker can perform any POST action on the 
database by submitting the form. POST actions include adding 
documents. For example, an attacker controls a malicious 
website and tricks an employee of company A to browse to 
that website, a technique called spear phishing (step 1 in Fig 
2). Once the employee browses to the website a script submits 
an HTML form with an Action URL of an internal NoSQL 
DB (step 2). Since the employee is inside the secure network 
the DB is accessible for him and the action will succeed (step 
3). 
 
Figure 2: CSRF via NoSQL REST API 
VIII. MITIGATION 
Mitigating security risks in NoSQL deployments is important 
in light of the attack vectors we presented in this paper. Let’s 
examine a few recommendations for each of the threats: 
A. Security  scanning to prevent injections 
In order to mitigate injection attacks it is recommended to use 
out of the box encoding tools when building queries. For 
JSON queries such as in MongoDB and CouchDB almost all 
languages have good native encoding which will terminate the 
db.stores.mapReduce(function() {  
  for (var i = 0; i < this.items.length; i++) { 
       emit(this.name, this.items[i].a); 
  } 
},function(kv) { return 1; }, { out: 'x' }); 
db.injection.insert({success:1}); 
return 1;db.stores.mapReduce(function() { { emit(1,1); } }, 
function(name, sum) { return Array.sum(sum); }, { out: 
'totals' });" 
a);}},function(kv) { return 1; }, { out: 'x' 
});db.injection.insert({success:1});return 
1;db.stores.mapReduce(function() { { emit(1,1 
$map = "function() {  
  for (var i = 0; i < this.items.length; i++) { 
       emit(this.name, this.items[i].$param); } }";        
$reduce = "function(name, sum) { return Array.sum(sum); }";      
$opt = "{ out: 'totals' }"; 
$db->execute("db.stores.mapReduce($map, $reduce, $opt);"); 
injection risk. It is also recommended to run Dynamic 
Application Security Testing (DAST) and static code analysis 
on the application in order to find any injection vulnerabilities 
if coding guidelines were not followed ‎[18]. The problem is 
that many of the tools in the market today still lack rules for 
detecting NoSQL injections. DAST methodology is 
considered more reliable than static analysis ‎[20], especially if 
used in conjunction with some backend inspection technology 
that improves detection reliability, a methodology referred to 
as Interactive Application Security Testing (IAST) ‎[21]‎[22]. 
B. REST API exposure 
To mitigate the risks of REST API exposure and CSRF 
attacks, there is a need to control the requests, limiting their 
format. For example, CouchDB has adopted some important 
security measures that mitigate the risk from having a REST 
API exposed. These measures include accepting only JSON in 
the content type. HTML forms are limited to URL encoded 
content type and hence an attacker will not be able to use html 
forms for CSRF and the other alternative is using AJAX 
requests and those are blocked by the browser thanks to same 
origin policy. It is also important to make sure JSONP and 
CORS are disabled in the server API to make sure that no 
actions can be made directly from a browser. It is important to 
note that some databases like MongoDB have many third 
party REST API’s which are encouraged by the main project, 
some of these are really lacking in the security measures we 
described here. 
C. Access Control and Prevention of Privilege Escalation   
In the past NoSQL did not support proper authentication and 
role management ‎[9], today it is possible to manage proper 
authentication and RBAC authorization on most popular 
NoSQL databases. Utilizing these mechanisms is important 
for two reasons. First, they allow enforcing the principle of 
least privilege thus preventing privilege escalation attacks by 
legitimate users. Second, similarly to SQL injection 
attacks ‎[19], proper privilege isolation allows to minimize the 
damage in case of data store exposure via the above described 
injections. Figure 3 illustrates an example in which the data 
accessible via a web application is authorized with a “user” 
role, while the sensitive entries require the “admin” role, 
which is never granted via the web interface. This allows 
scoping the damage in case of attack, ensuring that no 
administrators’ data is leaked.  
 
Figure 3: RBAC implemented on a NoSQL data store 
IX. SUMMARY 
We have shown that NoSQL databases suffer from the same 
security risks as their SQL counterparts. Some of the low level 
techniques and protocols have changed but still the risks of 
injection, improper access control management and unsafe 
network exposure are high and similar between SQL and 
NoSQL systems. We recommend using mature databases with 
built-in security measures. However, even using the most 
secure data store does not prevent injection attacks which 
leverage vulnerabilities in the web applications accessing the 
data store. One way to prevent these is via careful code 
examination and static analysis. However, these may have 
high false positive rates and are difficult to conduct. While, 
dynamic analysis tools were shown to be very useful for the 
detection of SQL injection attacks ‎[21], these should be 
adjusted to detect the specific vulnerabilities of NoSQL 
databases that we described in this paper.  
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